Does ETF Ownership Increase Stock Volatility? by Bysted, Daniel & Lundkvist, John
 
 
 
 
 
Does ETF Ownership Increase Stock Volatility? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor Thesis of Science in Financial Economics  
John Lundkvist, guslunjocl@student.gu.se  
Daniel Bystedt, gusbysteda@student.gu.se  
Supervisor: Marcin Zamojski 
Spring 2019 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are supposed to be priced equal to the net asset value of their 
underlying stocks, if not, opportunities of arbitrage occur and are quickly corrected by 
arbitrageurs. When a demand or liquidity shock hits the ETF market, the price of the 
underlying stocks are affected due to arbitrage trading. This thesis explores the relationship 
between ETF ownership and the underlying stock volatility. We have conducted a similar 
research as Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2017a) but for the western European 
market, where we in addition investigate the importance of company size and the effect of 
crises. The results from the European ETF market show a negative relationship between ETF 
ownership and stock volatility, which contradicts precedent U.S. research. This relationship is 
also stronger for big companies, and in periods out of crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) have increased in popularity in recent years. According to 
Bloomberg, ETFs now account for 25% of the daily trading volume in the U.S. stock market 
(Bloomberg, 2018). There are conflicting opinions regarding how and if ETFs affect the 
markets. Vanguard Group, which is the second largest provider of ETFs, posit that ETF 
ownership should not affect volatility due to the relatively small size of the ETF market 
compared to the overall financial assets (Vanguard 2018), whilst Ben-David et al. (2017a, 
2017b), have found evidence of correlation between ETF ownership and stock volatility. Our 
results differ from the ones of Ben-David et al. (2017a), as we find a negative relationship 
between ETF ownership and the volatility of the underlying stocks. There seems to be 
differences in stock volatility sensitivity depending on the company size and also on the state 
the economy is in.  
 
An ETF is a commodity that is similar to both a fund and a stock. It is a portfolio of securities 
that one can trade like a stock, i.e., it is possible to sell short, it is possible to lever, and ETFs 
are traded in liquid markets on a daily basis. The increased liquidity in comparison to mutual 
funds is likely to attract high frequency demand since they are easier to trade. If a demand 
shock makes the price of an ETF deviate from the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the ETF’s 
portfolio, arbitrage opportunities occurs. Investors then, exploit the difference in price 
between the NAV and the ETF. This effect in turn propagates to the other underlying 
securities that are included in the ETF portfolio. Tax efficiency1, higher liquidity and lower 
management fees are some of the benefits of buying ETFs instead of mutual funds. In 
addition, choosing ETFs over stocks simplifies diversification since ETFs consist of a basket 
of various securities (indices, commodities, bonds or stocks).  
 
Deviation from the fundamental value of the ETF is affected by a demand or liquidity shock 
in the ETF market. These shocks could be due to new information arriving  to the market. 
New information leads the investors to act rapidly and depending on its nature, more buy 
(sell) orders is conducted. Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) argue that it is the frequency of 
trades that affects the volatility, not the volume.  Thus a stock with higher liquidity is then 
going to experience more volatility if the frequency of trades is what determines the 
                                                
1 Generally, ETFs create fewer taxable events (dividends, gains, exercising options) than mutual funds. 
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volatility. If the information is positive (e.g., the firm exceeds analysts revenue expectations) 
more buy orders would hit the market. This clustering of directional trade-orders is what 
Karpoff (1987) argues is determining price changes. Arbitrageurs locate the differences in 
price and exploit them until the price reverts back to fundamental value, i.e, equilibrium (see 
Figure A.1 in Appendix A). When a demand or a liquidity shock occurs in the ETF market, 
the effect propagates to all underlying securities. This may cause comovement of the 
securities in the ETF basket. The other way around, if a demand or liquidity shock hits one of 
the stocks in the basket, the price of that stock increases, making the ETF price increase and 
causes indirect demand for the residual stocks. 
 
We investigate ETFs impact on volatility in the Western European market where no prior 
research regarding this issue exists to the best of our knowledge. There is indirect evidence 
that arbitrage is one of the main drivers of flows to and from ETFs and that it has an effect on 
volatility of the underlying assets. Ben-David et al. (2017a) conclude that further research 
regarding if and how arbitrage opportunities affect volatility is needed, and if there are other 
factors that influence the volatility. The National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) is a Securities 
Exchange Commission regulation that obligates financial brokers to execute their trades at 
the best ask or bid price available. Ben-David et al. (2017a) show that the flows to ETFs are 
larger than the size of the flows in and out of the NBBO. When this occur, the orders (flows) 
need to access quotes that are wider than the spread of the NBBO. Ben-David et al. (2017a) 
point out that fundamental2 flows play a smaller role, whilst the non-fundamental flows are 
the main driver of stock volatility. The flows and returns of ETFs move in the same direction 
and it is noted that the flows do not just cause a simple bid-ask bounce3. This suggests that 
the demand shock from flows to the ETFs causes movement up or down in the order book. In 
turn arbitrageurs always exploit these price fluctuations causing larger price movements.  
 
                                                
2 Fundamental flows are the intrinsic flows that occur due to trading. Non-fundamental flows are indirect flows 
which occurs when e.g. ETFs trades a stock, another stock in the ETF basket is then also bought to maintain the 
ETF price at fundamental value.  
3 A situation wherein the price bounces back and forth quickly within the limited range of the bid and the ask 
price. 
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2. Hypotheses 
Most research regarding ETFs and their possible effect on the underlying securities focuses 
on the U.S. market. The main purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to perform a similar 
research for the Western European market in order to understand if the impact of the ETFs 
are similar to the results of U.S. research. In addition, we investigate if  the effect of ETF 
ownership on the volatility of the underlying securities depends on the size of the companies. 
The sovereign debt crisis in 2009–2014 had a major impact on the European economy, and 
this thesis includes if this crisis, combined with the late stages of the global financial crisis of 
2008, had any significant impact on how ETF ownership affects the volatility of the 
underlying securities. However, the main focus of this thesis is to test if there is a relationship 
between ETF ownership and volatility, which provide us with the following hypothesis.  
 
I. There is a statistically significant relationship between ETF ownership and the 
volatility of the underlying stocks. 
 
Furthermore firms of various sizes operate in different ways. In general, larger firms are 
considered more stable and less volatile in returns than smaller firms. Smaller firms are also, 
in general, younger, with a larger potential growth. Growth potential leads to speculation and 
higher valuation, but also higher risk, which induces trading on the potential up-side of the 
investment. Larger firms are traded more frequently since they are included in larger indices, 
ETFs, and various types of funds, in which more investors operate. ETFs usually track 
indices, where larger firms are included more frequently. This implies that the effect of ETF 
ownership on volatility could differ depending on the size of the company. Thus providing us 
with our second hypothesis. 
 
II. There is a statistically significant difference in the relationship between ETF 
ownership and volatility for large and small companies. 
 
Historically there have been a number of financial crises which have affected the market, 
both domestically, and on a global scale. A financial crisis will influence the trading, prices 
and the volatility (amongst other things), and the European sovereign debt crisis is a big part 
of our sample. It seems intuitive that this period will have a notable impact on our results, 
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which makes us believe that there will be visible differences in the relationship between ETF 
ownership and volatility during periods of crisis. 
 
III. There is a statistically significant difference in relationship between ETF ownership 
and volatility during periods of crisis. 
3. The mechanics of ETFs 
Ben-David et al. (2017a) argue that ETFs have an incentive for liquidity trading, and that the 
ensuing price affects the underlying securities through arbitrage. They claim that stocks with 
higher ETF ownership should, ceteris paribus, exhibit higher volatility. The reasoning is as 
follows, if a liquidity shock hits the ETF market, arbitrageurs would try to absorb the 
liquidity demand by shorting the ETF after the shock influenced the ETF price. Risk aversion 
makes the arbitrageurs require compensation for the inventory in the ETF they are taking on, 
which makes the NAV of the underlying stocks price rise. The arbitrageurs then take a long 
position in the underlying securities that are in the ETF’s basket in order to hedge their short 
ETF position. The prices of the underlying securities in the ETF basket will then rise to 
compensate the market makers, and all prices eventually revert to fundamentals (See Figure 
A.1, Appendix A). Authorized Personnel (AP) create new ETF shares when the ETF is 
overvalued on the market by buying the underlying securities and sell them as ETF shares, if 
APs believe that it is undervalued they do the opposite and buy ETF shares and then sell the 
underlying securities of each ETF share. This process keeps the ETF price in line with the 
NAV of the underlying securities and is known as the creation and redemption mechanism.  
 
The price discovery4 at the ETF level leads to price discovery at the underlying securities 
level. Li and Zhu (2016) present another mechanism through which ETFs may enhance price 
efficiency. They argue that arbitrageurs use ETFs to circumvent short-sale constraints at the 
stock level. The authors use data on short interest of ETFs to compute the indirect short 
interest that is applied to each individual stock through ETFs that hold it. They document that 
this measure of stock-level short interest predicts stock returns and conclude that ETFs help 
improve market efficiency through this channel.  
  
                                                
4 The overall process of setting the correct spot price on assets. 
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Investing in an ETF is a cost-effective alternative for investors that wants to make a 
directional bet on the market. Lettau and Madhavan (2016), Madhavan (2016), and 
Madhavan and Sobczyk (2016) argue that ETFs enhance financial markets by reflecting new 
information before prices of the underlying securities adjust. Their explanation for this is that 
investors make directional bets on indices, thus the ETFs ability to transmit new information 
into the market will not transmit shocks into the stocks, but rather promote price discovery, as 
long as arbitrage is frictionless. This means that the price discovery of the ETFs leads to price 
discovery at the underlying securities level as well. 
 
Glosten, Nallareddy and Zou (2016)  show that once a stock is included in an ETF, it absorbs 
information faster than without ETF ownership. The authors claim that the stock prices can 
be explained by systematic information being absorbed quicker due to an increased co-
movement of stocks with their index. 
  
Da and Shive (2014) argue that investors trade ETFs more actively on index related news. 
They find that stocks included in an index have higher co-movement in returns. APs trade the 
securities that are included in the basket of their ETFs, exploiting the arbitrage to bring the 
value back to fundamental (see Figure 1, Appendix A) which indicates higher return co-
movement with the index and a lower level of idiosyncratic volatility. Thus, the stock level 
response is likely to be less prompt, and less sensitive to idiosyncratic earnings news. 
4. Literature review 
Ben-David et al. (2017a) look at ETFs between 2000 and 2015, that were listed on the U.S. 
exchanges with baskets containing only U.S. stocks. They use an index-switching5 event as 
an instrument variable for ETF ownership and observe that the impact of switching indices is 
stronger in months when ETF ownership is greater, and that there is a stronger impact for 
stocks with a higher ratio of ETF ownership compared to those owned by hedge-funds and 
mutual funds. Because of potential correlation between ETF ownership and the omitted 
variables, an instrumental variable is used to estimate the causal effect.  
 
                                                
5 I.e a switch from Russell 1000 to Russell 2000 (or vice versa). The switching of index could affect the 
liquidity and attractiveness of the stock to be included in funds and/or ETFs. 
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Ben-David et al. (2017a) interpret information about the fact that ETFs attract investors, 
whose demand is transmitted on to the underlying securities through arbitrage. The fact that 
ETFs effect on volatility is weaker for stocks with higher limits of arbitrage6, and the fact that 
the effect is stronger during times of intensified arbitrageur trading activity, is considered 
evidence of correlation between ETF arbitrage and stock volatility.  
 
There seems to be similarities between the paper by Ben-David et al. (2017a) and others 
regarding the effect of ETFs on asset prices. The idea that the underlying securities in an 
ETFs basket co-move because of the ETF transmitting shocks into all stocks in the basket is 
also present in Da and Shive (2015). They indicate that there is a connection between ETF 
ownership and higher co-movement of the underlying securities.  
	
L. Xu and X. Yin (2017) are investigating the ETFs and the indices which they track, and try 
to capture the interaction between the trading volume of ETFs and the volatility of the index. 
They find an upward trend on the index realized variance (S&P 500), where the slope gets 
steeper after the introduction of ETFs. They also find that the synchronic trading of S&P 500 
ETFs to be of great importance when determining the volatility of the index. However, it can 
also affect each other with a time delay (two-way Granger causality). This is not only true for 
S&P 500 but also for various market indices. Their results are of interest since this 
phenomenon can help explain why ETFs affect the underlying securities volatility by looking 
at the trades and their volume. Their results of a steeper upward trend after ETFs were 
introduced indicates that they do have an effect on the volatility of the index, and 
consequently the volatility of the underlying stocks.  
 
Chang et al. (2015) use the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indices to look for exogenous 
variation in ETFs ownership in stocks. They show a (2–3.5 times) larger amount of passively 
owned assets in the Russell 1000 (which includes the top 1000 firms by market capitalization 
from the Russell 3000) than in the Russell 2000 (which includes the bottom 2000 firms of the 
Russell 3000). Consequently, the top Russell 2000 stocks tracks a lot more passive money 
than the bottom of Russell 1000 according to Chang et.al (2015). They construct a cut-off 
(1000th-1001th stock in the Russell 3000) and find that there is a discontinuously higher ETF 
ownership to the right of the cut-off, than for stocks immediately to the left (see Figure A.3 in 
                                                
6 Stocks with low liquidity, short selling fees, and higher bid-ask spread. 
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Appendix A). The cut-off represent a change of index, this result is also present for index 
funds. To make sure that it is the ETF ownership, and not the index funds that drive their 
findings, they control for the index fund ownership. Their findings indicate that, when stocks 
transfer to a larger index, ETFs increases their ownership of that stock. It can be explained by 
the fact that many ETFs track indices, optimized replication, or that investors find stocks 
included in larger indices a safer investment. Ben-David et al. (2017) therefore control for 
this index-switching effect and use it as an instrumental variable in their regressions and find 
it highly significant.  
 
The regressions from Ben-David et al. (2017a) show a positive and strongly significant 
relationship between ETF ownership and volatility. However, the relationship between ETF 
ownership and volatility is weaker for smaller stocks (Ben-David et al. 2017a), due to 
dilution of the effect when the sample includes smaller stocks7. This may be a result of 
optimized replication, i.e, that arbitrageurs choose to focus on the larger stocks in the ETF 
baskets when constructing a replicating portfolio in order to minimize transaction costs. 
Similarly, the ETFs mimic underlying indices as well as possible, but not exactly. 
 
Ben-David et al. (2017a) do not control for firm fixed effects when performing their 
regressions with index-switching. Instead they only include time fixed effects when they 
perform their regressions on volatility. Their motivation for this is that their data is inherently 
cross sectional. They argue that when stocks jump from one index to another, invalid effects 
on volatility might occur only because of the membership of another index. Membership in 
larger indices leads to higher investor interest, and more liquidity, and trading. They show 
that changing index has a strong impact on ETF ownership. They find a significant 
relationship between ETF ownership and volatility in all regressions even if the index-
switching event is included or not.  
 
When stocks change from a small-cap to a large-cap index, their ETF ownership increases, 
and the IV estimates captures the effect of this. Ben-David et al. (2017a) also find a relation 
between adjusted churn ratio8 and ETF ownership, which follows the conjuncture that ETFs 
                                                
7 When regressions are made using the sample with stocks from  the Russell 3000 index instead of stocks from 
S&P 500. 
8 The churn ratio used by Ben-David et al. (2017a) takes a number between 1 and 0, and measures trades made 
in a certain period of time. If there are more sell trades than buy trades, or the opposite, the value will be closer 
to 0. If there are an equal number of buy and sell trades, the value will be equal to 1. 
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attract a high-turnover clientele. This would support that high-turnover investors make bigger 
investments in a stock when the ETF ownership for that specific stock is high. They also 
conclude that after a price increase in the ETF, due to a demand shock, the price of the 
underlying stock will follow the price of the ETF and then stay at the new level.  
 
Ben-David et al. (2017a) conclude that ETFs are very beneficial for investors due to the high 
liquidity and low cost. However, the ease of trade could lure in new high frequency investors 
who can cause demands shocks to the underlying securities of the ETFs. The fact that stocks 
with higher ETF ownership display higher volatility than other similar securities with lower 
ETF ownership is one of the papers main findings. The interpretation of this, with the help of 
a quasi-natural experiment9, is that ETFs do have an effect on the volatility of the underlying 
securities. Regarding the demand shocks in the ETF market, they impound a mean-reverting 
component in the asset prices. Ben-David et al. (2017) point out that non-fundamental 
demand shocks in the ETF market affect the prices of the underlying stocks via arbitrage. The 
ETFs effect on volatility is inflated due to the intensity of arbitrage activity between ETFs 
and their baskets. 
5. Method 
If liquidity and demand shocks in the ETF market have an effect on the underlying securities, 
there should be a larger effect if the ETF ownership is higher. In order to test this we look at 
ETF ownership for each stock and try to capture the effect of it. The ETF ownership show 
how much of the underlying stock that is owned by ETFs, in percentages. Ben-David et al. 
(2017a) present (1) as the basis for the regressions to test whether ETF ownership leads to 
higher volatility of the underlying securities. The formula provides us with three sources of 
variation in ETF ownership which potentially could be correlated with stock volatility.  
 𝐸𝑇𝐹	𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝.,0 = 	 23,4,56478 9:;3,4;<0	=>?3,4   (1)10 
 
                                                
9A quasi-experiment is an empirical interventional study used to estimate the causal impact of an intervention 
on target population without random assignment. 
10  i = stock, t = value of holdings by all ETFs investing in the stock, Mkt Cap = the stock’s market 
capitalization, J = set of ETFs holding stock I, wi,j,t = weight of the stock in the portfolio of ETF j, AUM (Assets 
under management)j,t = AUM of ETF j at the end of the month. 
 9 
Once we calculate ETF ownership using ep. (1)  we use it as the main regressor in our first 
regression. Our regressand, standardized volatility, is computed by finding the returns (2) and 
the realized volatility over 1 month (3) using daily data. This provides us with the daily 
volatility of stock i. 𝛿A = ln	( =E=EF8)   (2) 
 𝜎 = 	 𝛿I	.,0  (3) 
 
In addition, we include the lagged volatility as a control variable. Firm fixed effects account 
for other cross sectional differences between the stocks, e.g. some firms operate in more 
volatile markets than others. The time fixed effects captures effects of periods of higher/lower 
volatility. Inclusion of fixed effects helps remove omitted variable bias.  
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑	𝐸𝑇𝐹	𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙	𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑	𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑	𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 	𝜀.  
 
When testing if there is a statistically significant difference in the relationship between ETF 
ownership and volatility for large and small companies, a similar regression is made with the 
addition of a dummy variable. There is a cut-off based on market cap at €3.6 billion, where 
the companies with higher market cap than the cut-off are assigned 1, while the companies 
with smaller market capitalization than the cut-off are assigned 0. We base this cut-off on the 
smallest company on S&P 500 and the 500th company on the STOXX Europe 600 index.  
 
The third hypothesis is tested by using two similar but different methods. In the first method, 
we divide our sample into two parts; “in crisis” and “out of crisis”. Within the “in crisis” 
sample we include the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009-10-01–2014-03-31 and also 
the end of the global financial crisis of 2008-02-01–2009-03-31. By having one sample where 
all data included are from the periods of crisis, and the other sample only including data from 
periods out of crisis, we are able to compare the two samples. The second method is similar, 
but the full sample is intact and a dummy variable is used in order to classify if the specific 
information comes from a period in or out of crisis. In order to test for significance, the 
dummy variable is used as an interaction variable together with ETF ownership. 
 10 
6. Data Collection 
We follow the approach of Ben-David et al. (2017a) who work with U.S. data, but instead we 
focus on Western Europe. ETFs are a relatively new financial product, so data availability is 
lower compared to that for equities or mutual funds. Consequently, there are no data available 
prior to 2005 for this region. We see a spike in ETF ownership in 2009 (see Figure A.2 and 
A.4 in Appendix A). This may be a result of several ETFs not reporting their holdings before, 
or that they did not even exist prior to 2009. Thus, we restrict our sample to a period of 10 
years, starting in the end of 2008 up until 2019. We use Bloomberg to retrieve data for 
different ETFs and their reported stock holdings. We consider a sample size of 64 ETFs that 
invest in Western Europe, all of which have a large basket of securities. Ben-David et al. 
(2017a) use a sample size of 454 ETFs and use a time horizon of 15 years. Our sample size is 
smaller due to limited time. 
 
The sample data is collected using Bloomberg where we focus on Western Europe ETFs with 
at least a reported 10-year performance. We look at their holdings and retrieve monthly 
market values from the holdings analysis. For the underlying stocks we retrieve the daily 
market capitalization, which is our variable of interest and it will be used to compute the ETF 
ownership. Since our sample size only consists of ETFs that have at least a 10-year 
performance, there is a possibility for survivorship bias, i.e we only look at the ETFs that 
survived for at least 10 years. This means that our sample might be overestimating the actual 
performance of ETFs during this period of time. This is of great matter especially during the 
period of crisis, where the ETFs who did not make it through the crisis are overlooked. 
However, the survivorship bias does not only mean that poor performing ETFs that have not 
survived are excluded. It can also mean that high-performing ETFs that have not been on the 
market for ten years are excluded from the sample because of the 10-year performance 
limitation. 
 
The final sample contains 64 different ETFs and 1206 underlying stocks. The names are 
matched to the tickers of stocks in 26 large indices in the European zone. Collection of daily 
stock returns in order to calculate the daily stock volatility, market capitalization for each 
stock, volume, EBIT, bid-ask spread, total assets and daily stock prices is collected to use for 
calculations of our control variables, ETF ownership and volatility. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for our full sample 
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7. Results  
Table 2. ETF ownership 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership and controls. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are 
lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges between 2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
standardized etf share owned -0.0320 -0.0340 -0.0315 -0.0334 0.0039 0.0056 0.0037 0.0055
(-3.02) (-4.41) (-3.04) (-4.39) (0.37) (0.65) (0.36) (0.63)
*** *** *** ***
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0617 -0.0593 -0.0607 -0.0586 -0.2029 -0.1415 -0.2014 -0.1416
(-9.43) (-8.07) (-9.61) (-8.10) (-6.84) (-3.59) (-6.76) (-3.58)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0294 0.3561 0.0286 0.3496 0.1002 1.0680 0.1001 1.0686
(1.06) (1.44) (1.06) (1.43) (1.46) (3.20) (1.45) (3.20)
*** ***
amihud tm1 1040.6480 -169.9727 970.3847 -170.2014 358.7243 -97.9647 345.1266 -98.8869
(0.98) (-1.52) (0.98) (-1.54) (0.70) (-1.21) (0.70) (-1.23)
abs returns tm1 0.0003 0.0005 0.00 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(2.77) (2.94) (2.69) (2.77) (2.33) (1.35) (2.08) (1.31)
*** *** *** *** ** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0022 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0010
(1.21) (1.30) (-0.45) (-0.43)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2353 -0.2399 0.2684 0.2656
(-1.12) (-1.19) (1.11) (1.10)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0728 0.0404 0.0383 0.0054
(2.69) (2.00) (1.70) (0.66)
*** ** *
standardized volatility tm2 0.0548 0.0423 0.0211 0.0078
(4.19) (2.62) (3.06) (1.11)
*** *** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0432 0.0331 0.0107 -0.0008
(3.44) (2.18) (1.72) (-0.14)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4175 0.3396 0.4120 0.3367 1.5784 0.9722 1.5663 0.9731
(6.84) (4.93) (6.97) (4.98) (6.37) (3.05) (6.30) (3.05)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0241 0.0322 0.0326 0.0352 0.1945 0.1957 0.1962 0.1957
Standardized Volatility 
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In Table 2, all regressions without fixed effects (columns (1) to (4)) show significance on the 
1% level for ETF ownership with a negative coefficient that does not vary much. In Table 2, 
a one standard deviation increase of ETF ownership leads to a decrease of volatility by 
between 3.15% and 3.34% of a standard deviation. When adding fixed effects (columns (5) to 
(8)) the ETF ownership becomes insignificant. It is important to point out that time fixed 
effects do not affect the results, but the inclusion of firm fixed effects have a major impact. 
The firm fixed effects account for the differences between companies that are stable in time. 
Logged market capitalization is significant at 1% no matter if we apply fixed effects or not. 
Without fixed effects both absolute returns and the three lagged volatilities are significant in 
columns (1) to (4), however there are other interesting findings when looking at our control 
variables. When applying fixed effects (columns (5) to (8)), absolute returns are only 
significant in columns (5) and (7) where the bid-ask spread and gross profitability are 
excluded. The opposite can be said for the inverse of the price as this control variable only 
become significant when bid-ask spread and gross profitability are included. An important 
fact that needs to be considered is the size of the coefficient for absolute returns, since it is 
close to zero. It can therefore be discussed whether this effect is economically significant. 
Table 2 is a compressed version of Table B.5 in Appendix B. In Table B.5 in Appendix B 
sixteen regressions are made where we in addition include time fixed and firm fixed effects 
separately. 
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Table 3 ETF ownership with “Big” dummy variable 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “big” as interaction variables, and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The lagged variables (tm1) are lagged 1, 2, or 3 months. The sample ranges 
between 2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
big# ETF Ownership 0 -0.0229 -0.0334 -0.0227 -0.0330 0.0089 0.0153 0.0087 0.0151
(-1.60) (-2.76) (-1.62) (-2.76) (0.77) (1.26) (0.78) (1.25)
*** ***
big# ETF Ownership 1 -0.0461 -0.0346 -0.0450 -0.0338 -0.0139 -0.0169 -0.0141 -0.0171
(-4.22) (-4.05) (-4.23) (-4.04) (-1.15) (-1.69) (-1.17) (-1.71)
*** *** *** *** * *
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0619 -0.0593 -0.0609 -0.0586 -0.2032 -0.1420 -0.2016 -0.1420
(-9.48) (-8.07) (-9.66) (-8.10) (-6.85) (-3.60) (-6.77) (-3.60)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0293 0.3562 0.0285 0.3497 0.1003 1.0692 0.1001 1.0697
(1.06) (1.44) (1.06) (1.43) (1.46) (3.20) (1.45) (3.20)
*** ***
amihud tm1 1042.3100 -169.7787 972.0534 -170.0533 357.6203 -100.7711 344.0276 -101.6868
(0.98) (-1.52) (0.98) (-1.53) (0.70) (-1.27) (0.70) (-1.28)
abs returns tm1 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(2.75) (2.95) (2.67) (2.77) (2.33) (1.35) (2.09) (1.31)
*** *** *** *** ** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0022 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0010
(1.21) (1.30) (-0.44) (-0.42)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2355 -0.2400 0.2729 0.2701
(-1.12) (-1.19) (1.12) (1.12)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0728 0.0404 0.0382 0.0053
(2.69) (2.00) (1.70) (0.66)
*** ** *
standardized volatility tm2 0.0547 0.0423 0.0211 0.0077
(4.19) (2.62) (3.06) (1.11)
*** *** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0431 0.0331 0.0107 -0.0008
(3.44) (2.18) (1.71) (-0.15)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4193 0.3396 0.4137 0.3367 1.5803 0.9760 1.5682 0.9770
(6.88) (4.93) (7.01) (4.98) (6.39) (3.06) (6.31) (3.06)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0243 0.0321 0.0328 0.0352 0.1946 0.1958 0.1962 0.1958
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In Table 3, ETF ownership is significant for big companies without fixed effects (columns (1) 
to (4)), and a one standard deviation increase of ETF ownership leads to a decrease of 
volatility by between 3.38% and 4.61% of a standard deviation. For small companies, ETF 
ownership is only significant in columns (2) and (4) where the liquidity measures are 
included and fixed effects are excluded. However, the magnitude of the relationship between 
ETF ownership and standardized volatility varies. A one standard deviation increase of ETF 
ownership leads to a decrease of volatility by between 3.30% and 3.34% of a standard 
deviation. The inclusion of fixed effects, especially firm fixed effects, causes insignificance 
for ETF ownership and the variable is now only significant in columns (6) and (8) for big 
companies, where the liquidity measures are included. The results of the control variables are 
very similar to the results from Table 2, where logged market capitalization is significant in 
all columns. 
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Table 4. ETF ownership with “Crisis” dummy variable 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “crisis” as an interaction variable, and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges between 
2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
In Table 4 ETF Ownership is only significant out of crisis without fixed effects (columns (1) 
to (4)). A one standard deviation increase of ETF ownership leads to a decrease of volatility 
by between 3.51% and 4.01% of a standard deviation, and there is significance at a 1% level 
in all four cases. The “in-crisis” ETF ownership coefficient is never significant, which 
indicates that there is no significant effect of ETF ownership on volatility during the period in 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis# ETF Ownership 0 -0.0356 -0.0401 -0.0351 -0.0393 0.0033 0.0021 0.0031 0.0020
(-3.34) (-5.42) (-3.41) (-5.41) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27) (0.27)
*** *** *** ***
crisis# ETF Ownership 1 -0.0272 -0.0179 -0.0266 -0.0177 0.0044 0.0128 0.0043 0.0127
(-1.51) (-1.20) (-1.52) (-1.21) (0.36) (0.78) (0.35) (0.77)
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0617 -0.0594 -0.0607 -0.0586 -0.2028 -0.1409 -0.2013 -0.1410
(-9.42) (-8.08) (-9.60) (-8.11) (-6.84) (-3.59) (-6.77) (-3.58)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0294 0.3554 0.0286 0.3490 0.1002 1.0685 0.1001 1.0691
(1.06) (1.43) (1.06) (1.43) (1.46) (3.20) (1.45) (3.20)
*** ***
amihud tm1 1040.1810 -171.3703 969.9138 -171.5710 358.8008 -98.0383 345.2045 -98.9639
(0.98) (-1.53) (0.98) (-1.55) (0.70) (-1.21) (0.70) (-1.23)
abs returns tm1 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(2.76) (2.94) (2.68) (2.77) (2.33) (1.35) (2.08) (1.31)
*** *** *** *** ** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0022 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0010
(1.22) (1.30) (-0.44) (-0.42)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2351 -0.2396 0.2711 0.2683
(-1.12) (-1.19) (1.12) (1.11)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0728 0.0404 0.0383 0.0054
(2.69) (2.00) (1.70) (0.66)
*** ** *
standardized volatility tm2 0.0548 0.0423 0.0211 0.0077
(4.19) (2.62) (3.06) (1.11)
*** *** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0432 0.0330 0.0107 -0.0008
(3.44) (2.18) (1.71) (-0.15)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4174 0.3398 0.4119 0.3369 1.5778 0.9669 1.5657 0.9679
(6.84) (4.94) (6.97) (4.99) (6.38) (3.05) (6.31) (3.04)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted	R^2 0.0241 0.0323 0.0326 0.0353 0.1945 0.1957 0.1962 0.1957
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crisis. The results of the control variables are yet again very similar to the results from Table 
2, where logged market capitalization is significant in all columns. 
 
Table 5. ETF ownership with “Crisis” and “Big” interaction terms 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “big” and “crisis” as interaction variables, and controls. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges 
between 2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership 0 0 -0.0297 -0.0389 -0.0297 -0.0383 0.0068 0.0098 0.0065 0.0097
(-1.86) (-3.83) (-1.94) (-3.85) (0.46) (1.11) (0.46) (1.10)
* *** * ***
crisis#big# ETF Ownership 0 1 -0.0443 -0.0416 -0.0430 -0.0406 -0.0114 -0.0192 -0.0115 -0.0193
(-4.53) (-4.43) (-4.54) (-4.42) (-0.81) (-1.47) (-0.82) (-1.48)
*** *** *** ***
crisis#big# ETF Ownership 1 0 -0.0139 -0.0092 -0.0135 -0.0092 0.0112 0.0405 0.0111 0.0403
(-0.64) (-0.24) (-0.64) (-0.25) (0.84) (1.12) (0.85) (1.12)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership 1 1 -0.0486 -0.0223 -0.0478 -0.0219 -0.0164 -0.0128 -0.0166 -0.0130
(-2.83) (-2.14) (-2.87) (-2.13) (-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.24) (-1.22)
*** ** *** **
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0619 -0.0593 -0.0609 -0.0586 -0.2029 -0.1406 -0.2014 -0.1406
(-9.48) (-8.09) (-9.67) (-8.12) (-6.85) (-3.60) (-6.78) (-3.59)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0294 0.3560 0.0285 0.3495 0.1003 1.0706 0.1001 1.0711
(1.06) (1.43) (1.06) (1.43) (1.46) (3.20) (1.45) (3.20)
*** ***
amihud tm1 1042.2940 -170.6754 972.0404 -170.9335 357.9312 -101.2357 344.3456 -102.1551
(0.98) (-1.53) (0.98) (-1.54) (0.70) (-1.27) (0.70) (-1.29)
abs returns tm1 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
(2.75) (2.94) (2.67) (2.77) (2.34) (1.36) (2.09) (1.32)
*** *** *** *** ** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0022 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0010
(1.21) (1.30) (-0.45) (-0.42)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2356 -0.2401 0.2812 0.2784
(-1.13) (-1.19) (1.15) (1.14)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0728 0.0404 0.0382 0.0053
(2.69) (2.00) (1.70) (0.66)
*** ** *
standardized volatility tm2 0.0547 0.0422 0.0211 0.0077
(4.19) (2.62) (3.06) (1.11)
*** *** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0431 0.0330 0.0107 -0.0008
(3.44) (2.18) (1.71) (-0.16)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4192 0.3395 0.4136 0.3367 1.5785 0.9639 1.5663 0.9650
(6.88) (4.94) (7.01) (4.99) (6.39) (3.05) (6.32) (3.05)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Time-fixed	effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed	effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted	R^2 0.0243 0.0323 0.0328 0.0353 0.1946 0.1959 0.1962 0.1959
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Table 5 includes a double (both “big” and “crisis”) interaction with ETF ownership. There is 
no significance for ETF ownership in columns (5) to (8) where fixed effects are included. 
However, we find significance for ETF ownership in columns (1) to (4) for big companies in 
and out of crisis, and small companies out of crisis. This means that the size of the company 
matters for the significance of ETF ownership when in a period of crisis. There seems to be a 
stronger negative effect for big companies in periods out of crisis than periods in crisis. For 
big companies in crisis in columns (2) and (4) a one standard deviation increase of ETF 
ownership leads to a decrease of volatility by between 2.19% and 2.23% of a standard 
deviation. When looking at the same columns but for big companies out of crisis there is a 
stronger negative relationship between ETF ownership and standardized volatility, where a 
one standard deviation increase of ETF ownership leads to a decrease of volatility by between 
4.06% and 4.16% of a standard deviation. This means that there is a stronger relationship 
between ETF ownership and standardized volatility for big companies in periods out of crisis, 
than periods in crisis. When looking at the control variables, the results are similar to Table 2. 
 
We reproduce the regressions from Table 2 and Table 3 with a split sample. One part of the 
sample only includes the periods in crisis, and the other sample only includes the periods out 
of crisis. This means that we now only use the “big” dummy variable as an interaction 
variable with ETF ownership.  
 
In Table B.1 in Appendix B , where our dataset only includes data from the periods in crisis, 
there is no significance for ETF ownership. When comparing this to Table 2 we find that 
absolute returns now is significant in all columns. There is also a difference in the 
significance of lagged volatility. No matter if fixed effects are included or not, there are fewer 
lagged volatility variables that are significant than in Table 2. An interesting finding is that 
the inverse of the price no longer is significant in columns (6) and (8), but now is significant 
in columns (1) to (4), and columns (5) and (7). This is the complete opposite from the results 
reported in Table 2.  
 
When we include “big” as an interaction variable with ETF ownership in Table B.2 in 
Appendix B, we do not find any significance for small companies in the “in-crisis” dataset. 
However, the coefficient for ETF ownership is significant for big companies in columns (1) 
to (4) where fixed effects are excluded, and also in columns (6) and (8) where fixed effects 
and liquidity measures are included. When comparing these results to Table 3 there are some 
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interesting findings. In Table B.2 in Appendix B the magnitude of the negative relationship 
between ETF ownership and standardized volatility in columns (1) to (4) is weaker, but in 
columns (6) and (8) the magnitude of the relationship is stronger.  
 
When comparing the results in Table B.2 in Appendix B to Table 5 there is an interesting 
difference in columns (6) and (8). In the dataset only including periods in crisis there is 
significance of ETF ownership in both columns. However, in Table 5 where the dataset 
includes the full sample and we instead use “crisis” as an interaction variable, there is no 
significance for ETF ownership in regressions including fixed effects (columns (5) to (8)).  
 
In Table B.3 in Appendix B , where our dataset only includes data from the periods out of 
crisis, the results are quite similar to the results in Table 2, where ETF ownership is 
significant when no fixed effects are applied, and logged market capitalization is significant 
on a 1% level in all regressions. However, the significance level for absolute returns is 
different compared to earlier output. It is only significant when the liquidity measures and 
fixed effects are excluded. The lagged volatility and the inverse of price is significant in the 
same scenarios as Table 2.  
 
In Table B.4 in Appendix B, being a big company out of crisis results in a larger negative 
effect than for small companies. There is significance for ETF ownership for both big and 
small companies, similar to the results from Table 3. The differences is larger when the 
liquidity measures and fixed effects are excluded. ETF ownership gains significance for small 
companies in columns (1) and (3), but columns (6) and (8) for big companies are no longer 
significant. However, there are no noteworthy changes in the coefficients. 
8. Robustness 
The way we perform our regressions is a well-known approach to find what factors influence 
the dependent variable. We add and remove control variables in order to capture their specific 
effect on the standardized volatility, as discussed in the previous section. In Table B.1 to B.4 
in Appendix B, we perform another method of a robustness check where we divide our 
sample. The split sample regressions alter our explanatory variables to fit either “in crisis” or 
“out of crisis”, which will affect all estimators.  
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In addition we perform a robustness test where we use a similar method as L. Xu and X. Yin 
(2017). We compute our regressions again, this time with realized variance as our dependent 
variable instead of standardized volatility. Variance and volatility is both used to measure the 
movement of an assets returns from the mean. Variance is not necessarily bound by any time 
period, whilst volatility is a measure of the standard deviation over a certain time interval. 
Both terms are used interchangeably in finance to determine the risk factor. We therefore 
include it to see if the regressions provide us with similar results when looking at two 
resembling measurements of risk. 
 
In Table B.6 in Appendix B, which is a replication of Table 2, we find a weaker negative 
relationship between ETF ownership and our dependent variable. The ETF ownership is 
significant in columns (1) to (3), but insignificant in columns (4) to (8). Except for ETF 
ownership being insignificant in column (4), the results corroborates to our results in Table 2 
in terms of significance. However, when we compare Table B.7 in Appendix B to Table 5, 
where both “big” and “crisis” are included as interaction variables with ETF ownership, the 
significance differs. There is no longer any significance for small companies, no matter if it is 
a period in crisis or not. When looking at big companies out of crisis, the results regarding 
significance corroborates to the results in Table 5. However, for big companies in crisis there 
are some findings that are hard to interpret. In Table B.7 in Appendix B, we find significance 
for ETF ownership for big companies in crisis, but only when the liquidity measures are 
excluded (columns (1) and (3)). Even when fixed effects are included the variable is 
significant (columns (5) and (7)), and the relationship between ETF ownership and realized 
variance is also stronger for these two columns than column (1) and (3) without fixed effects. 
 
For the dataset only including data from periods in crisis (Table B.8 in Appendix B), ETF 
ownership for big companies is significant in columns (1), (2) and (4). Small companies are 
never significant and the large companies only matters when fixed effects is excluded. This 
corroborates to our findings regarding the volatility, except for column (3) where significance 
is lost when looking at realized variance.  
 
For the dataset only including data from periods out of crisis (Table B.9 in Appendix B), ETF 
ownership for big companies is only significant in columns (1) and (3) where neither fixed 
effects nor liquidity measures are included.  
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Overall there seems to be a significant relationship between lagged standardized volatilities 
and realized variance when fixed effects and all control variables are applied. This is not the 
case for the regressions where standardized volatility is the dependent variable. The biggest 
difference when looking at control variables is logged market capitalization. When volatility 
is the dependent variable there is significance for logged market capitalization in all 
regressions. When we instead use realized variance as the dependent variable, the logged 
market capitalization is only significant in columns (1) and (3). This is the scenarios where 
there are no fixed effects applied and bid-ask spread and gross profitability are excluded. 
 
We winsorized the data to see if removing outliers made any significant differences in our 
regressions. We created winsor variables on the 1% and 5% level, the regressors does not 
become significant and the coefficients barely change. Thus we conclude that no outliers 
affect our sample in any significant way. 
9. Analysis  
Our results do not corroborate to the findings of Ben-David et al. (2017a). In contradiction to 
the positive relationship between ETF ownership and volatility that is presented by Ben-
David et al. (2017a) we find a negative relationship whose significance is questionable. This 
is a finding that might be explained by market and regional differences between the U.S. and 
Europe. The size of the ETF market in Europe is just a fraction of the ETF market in the U.S. 
(Investment Europe, 2019). 40% of the ETF holdings in our sample are companies that are 
big enough to fit into S&P 500, which suggests that the European ETFs are investing in 
bigger companies that essentially have a lower volatility. The small firm effect posits that 
larger firms tend to be less volatile than smaller ones. This is due to a better established firm 
being less exposed to fluctuations in the market while the small firms have higher growth 
opportunities which leads to larger future return expectations, thus making the price of the 
stock more volatile.  
 
The logged market capitalization coefficient is negative and is significant (at the 1% level) 
for all our regressions. This corresponds to the small firm effect, that there is a significant 
negative relationship between the size of a firm and its volatility. When looking at Table 3, 
the output indicates that there is a negative relationship between ETF ownership and 
volatility. The relationship is significant in six out of eight cases for big companies, but only 
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two out of eight cases for small companies. This in combination with a stronger relationship 
for big companies yet again suggests that the size of a company matters. These results 
corroborates, to some extent, to the findings of Ben-David et al. (2017a) where the 
relationship between ETF ownership and volatility is weaker for small companies than for 
big companies. However, the relationship is negative in our findings which contradicts the 
positive relationship found by Ben-David et al. (2017a). ETF ownership being significant 
more frequently for big companies could also be explained by optimized replication. When 
investors try to replicate the ETF portfolio, smaller stocks are often overlooked in order to 
keep transaction costs as low as possible.   
 
When testing Hypothesis I in Table 2, there is significance for ETF ownership at the 1% level 
whenever fixed effects are excluded. According to Table B.5 in Appendix B, time fixed 
effects do not affect the results that much and there is still significance at the 1% level. 
However, when firm fixed effects are applied the significance for ETF ownership is lost. The 
firm fixed effects capture cross-sectional differences between companies that are stable in 
time. ETF ownership could be driven by something that also drives volatility, and this may be 
the cause as to why including firm fixed effects wipe out significance.  
 
When comparing the split samples “out of crisis” and “in crisis” we notice that coefficients 
and significance differ. In crisis there is no significance for small companies, whereas 
significance is found for both small and big companies in the “out of crisis” sample. This 
suggests that the ETF ownership does not affect the volatility of small companies in periods 
of crisis. In a period of crisis, other factors could affect small companies more than they 
affect big companies which in turn negates the relationship between ETF ownership and 
volatility. Investment behaviour change within periods of crisis, causing the number of 
investments to decrease. The investments made will most likely be investments with low risk, 
which will affect smaller companies the most. In a comparison between Table B.1 and Table 
B.3 in Appendix B, the relationship between ETF ownership and volatility is insignificant in 
the dataset where only periods in crisis are included. For the dataset in which only periods out 
of crisis are included the relationship is significant at the 1% level whenever fixed effects are 
excluded. This is in line with hypothesis III, since there is a significant difference in the 
relationship between ETF ownership and volatility for periods in or out of crisis. 
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10. Conclusion 
Our results provide us with evidence of a negative relationship between ETF ownership and 
stock volatility. The statistical significance of this finding depend heavily on model 
specification. However, this finding contradicts previous U.S. research, which indicates that 
the European ETF markets works differently. Further research is required in order to fully 
understand how the European ETF market works and its relationship with stock volatility. 
 
It can be concluded that the size of a company is very important when discussing stock 
volatility. It is intuitive that companies with higher market capitalization have lower 
volatility, which is in line with the results of our logged market capitalization. The 
significance of ETF ownership for big companies in combination with a stronger relationship 
with volatility provides us with significant arguments for Hypothesis II.  
 
As discussed in the analysis section, when the dummy variable “crisis” is used, we find 
significance for ETF ownership in both periods in and out of crisis. However, when 
conducting regressions with split samples and no interaction variables, ETF ownership is 
only significant for periods out of crisis. This suggests that there is a difference in the 
relationship between ETF ownership and stock volatility when the market is experiencing 
turbulence.  
 
Our results are different than what precedent research have found, it can mainly be explained 
by the differences in markets (Europe vs U.S.), the difference in the amount of money 
invested in the ETF market in Europe and in the U.S. and also that our sample is imperfect. 
The results might be different due to us not being able to investigate the index-switching 
event that Chang et al. (2015) and Ben-David et al. (2017a) used in their theses. For further 
future research, an index-switching instrumental variable should be included to see if the 
effects of it is similar in Europe. We believe that a stock being included in a larger index has 
an effect on the volume of trading and the amount of media coverage it gets. Unfortunately, 
due to limited time we could not include such an IV in our regressions.   
 
We are interested in seeing whether or not ETFs helps with price discovery at a stock level. 
There are some precedent research regarding this issue, however, we have not found anything 
on the european market. Are ETFs more than just an investment? Is it possible that ETFs can 
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be beneficial for investors, informed as uninformed? Do ETFs increase the markets efficiency 
in terms of accommodating the information faster and/or better and therefore price the assets 
more efficiently? Since this is outside the scope of this thesis we will leave this for further 
research.  
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12. Appendix A 
DATA APPENDIX 
When retrieving the data, we could only look at 40 time periods at a time, hence the 
collection part exceeded the expected time. The final list contains 64 different ETFs and 1206 
underlying stocks. The names are matched to the names of stocks in 26 large indices in the 
European zone. The largest indices in Austria, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, 
Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, Greece, Poland, Russia and Hungary11 are used. We found the tickers using 
the VLOOKUP function in Excel, matching the names of the firm to their ticker names found 
in the large indices, in order to collect the daily data for each stock directly from Bloomberg. 
The values were originally reported in local currencies, thus not comparable. This is solved 
by using the same currency and since we are looking at Europe, the obvious choice of 
currency is the Euro. Python is used to merge the different excel files together and restructure 
                                                
11 ASX, NMX, UKX, DAX, PXAP, PAX, SBF 250, MADX, SMI, SPI, ITLMS, BVLX, ISEQ, ICEXI, AEX, 
BELSTK, OMXC25, HEXP, OSEAX, OMX, WBI, SAX, ASE, WIG, IMOEX, BUX 
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in order to make the data more manageable. In addition python is used to calculate and 
conduct the different control variables needed for our regressions that we were not able to 
download from Bloomberg. We use Python to calculate the lagged volatilities, formula 2 is 
used to get the returns, formula 3 is used to get the monthly volatility. We use monthly data 
on most variables, thus the monthly volatility is calculated. Python is used to lag all variables 
in order to replicate the regressions of Ben-David et al.  
 
We collect the data using the Bloomberg spreadsheet function in excel, to gather information 
for market capitalization, volume, closing price, EBIT, bid and ask spread and total assets. 
We use the closing price to calculate the daily returns using formula (2), then by using 
Python the volatility is calculated using formula (3). The other variables are used to calculate 
our control variables in the regressions. Market capitalization is used as a benchmark for our 
dummy variables implemented in hypothesis II, where companies with a market 
capitalization less than €3.6 billion =0 and above the threshold =1. For hypothesis III we 
perform the same regressions as for hypothesis I and II but divide our sample into two parts. 
We divide our sample in time where one part only contains data from the period within crisis, 
and the other part contains the periods out of crisis. Dummy variables based on in (=1) or out 
of crisis (=0) are implemented for both parts and the full sample in order to have the 
possibility of comparison between the regressions.  
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Figure A.1
 
Source: Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Rabih Moussawi. 2017b, Exchange Traded 
Funds, NBER Working Paper Series 22829.  
 
Figure A.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Figure A.3 
Source: Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni and Rabih Moussawi, 2017a, Do ETFs 
increase volatility?, Dice Center WP 2011-20, Fisher College of Business WP 2011-03-20. 
 
Figure A.4 
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13. Appendix B 
Table B.1 - ETF ownership in Crisis 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership and controls. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are 
lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes periods in crisis and ranges between 2008-
09-30- to 2009-03-31, and 2009-10-01 to 2014-03-31. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
standardized etf share owned -0.0219 -0.0206 -0.0213 -0.0187 -0.0003 -0.0038 -0.0009 -0.0038
(-1.36) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-1.35) (-0.03) (-0.13) (-0.08) (-0.13)
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0510 -0.0738 -0.0504 -0.0705 -0.3340 -0.2524 -0.3383 -0.2509
(-6.94) (-5.42) (-7.05) (-6.49) (-6.57) (-2.84) (-6.17) (-2.90)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.3082 0.4593 0.2784 0.4303 0.2474 0.2636 0.2338 0.2700
(6.71) (2.38) (5.63) (2.42) (6.02) (0.80) (5.44) (0.83)
*** ** *** ** *** ***
amihud tm1 1182.7930 -589.0032 1015.2660 -533.9777 240.3822 -221.0149 165.0464 -221.5511
(0.62) (-1.60) (0.57) (-1.51) (0.30) (-1.24) (0.21) (-1.25)
abs returns tm1 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(3.87) (3.65) (3.93) (3.87) (1.71) (1.93) (1.73) (1.92)
*** *** *** *** * * * *
bid ask spread tm1 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.29) (-0.18) (-0.27) (-0.26)
gross profitability tm1 -0.1033 -0.0643 0.4168 0.4133
(-0.40) (-0.26) (1.49) (1.49)
standardized volatility tm1 0.1962 0.2473 0.1318 0.0250
(6.01) (1.87) (6.28) (0.52)
*** * ***
standardized volatility tm2 0.0654 0.2242 0.0036 0.0133
(1.61) (1.81) (0.17) (0.28)
*
standardized volatility tm3 0.0560 0.2810 -0.0069 -0.0172
(1.56) (1.65) (-0.35) (-0.29)
 cons 0.2660 0.3860 0.2686 0.3780 2.5637 1.8161 2.6024 1.8057
(4.02) (3.13) (4.19) (3.63) (6.26) (2.54) (5.89) (2.58)
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** **
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 30476 10760 30407 10751 30422 10688 30352 10679
Adjusted R^2 0.0847 0.0434 0.1039 0.0736 0.2821 0.332 0.2901 0.332
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0243 0.0321 0.0328 0.0352 0.1946 0.1958 0.1962 0.1958
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Table B.2. ETF ownership Big in Crisis 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “big” as an interaction variable, and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes 
periods in crisis and ranges between 2008-09-30- to 2009-03-31, and 2009-10-01 to 2014-03-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
big# ETF Ownership 0 -0.0100 -0.0120 -0.0099 -0.0122 0.0054 0.0157 0.0046 0.0157
(-0.51) (-0.31) (-0.53) (-0.36) (0.48) (0.36) (0.41) (0.36)
big# ETF Ownership 1 -0.0411 -0.0249 -0.0398 -0.0220 -0.0212 -0.0379 -0.0208 -0.0377
(-2.84) (-2.34) (-2.92) (-2.09) (-1.43) (-2.15) (-1.42) (-2.03)
*** ** *** ** ** *
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0514 -0.0736 -0.0508 -0.0704 -0.3338 -0.2536 -0.3382 -0.2522
(-7.02) (-5.43) (-7.13) (-6.51) (-6.58) (-2.86) (-6.18) (-2.91)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.3083 0.4629 0.2785 0.4331 0.2476 0.2657 0.2340 0.2720
(6.71) (2.38) (5.64) (2.42) (6.03) (0.81) (5.44) (0.83)
*** ** *** ** *** ***
amihud tm1 1189.8790 -584.1764 1022.2470 -530.3679 242.4086 -217.2046 167.0811 -217.7490
(0.63) (-1.57) (0.58) (-1.49) (0.30) (-1.23) (0.21) (-1.24)
abs returns tm1 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(3.79) (3.66) (3.84) (3.87) (1.71) (1.93) (1.74) (1.92)
*** *** *** *** * * * *
bid ask spread tm1 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-0.30) (-0.19) (-0.27) (-0.25)
gross profitability tm1 -0.1045 -0.0653 0.4252 0.4218
(-0.41) (-0.26) (1.51) (1.51)
standardized volatility tm1 0.1960 0.2471 0.1317 0.0246
(6.02) (1.87) (6.28) (0.52)
*** * ***
standardized volatility tm2 0.0653 0.2241 0.0036 0.0131
(1.61) (1.81) (0.17) (0.27)
*
standardized volatility tm3 0.0560 0.2808 -0.0069 -0.0175
(1.57) (1.65) (-0.35) (-0.30)
 cons 0.2687 0.3846 0.2712 0.3770 2.5618 1.8266 2.6005 1.8163
(4.07) (3.13) (4.24) (3.63) (6.27) (2.55) (5.89) (2.60)
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** **
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 30476 10760 30407 10751 30422 10688 30352 10679
Adjusted R^2 0.085 0.0434 0.1042 0.0735 0.2822 0.3322 0.2902 0.3322
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Table B.3 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “big” as an interaction variable and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes 
periods out of crisis and ranges between 2009-04-01 to 2009-09-30, and 2014-04-01 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
standardized etf share owned -0.0349 -0.0384 -0.0345 -0.0378 -0.0034 0.0043 -0.0037 0.0041
(-3.28) (-5.24) (-3.32) (-5.24) (-0.18) (0.84) (-0.20) (0.80)
*** *** *** ***
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0612 -0.0528 -0.0605 -0.0523 -0.1825 -0.1262 -0.1824 -0.1269
(-8.17) (-6.99) (-8.27) (-7.00) (-4.81) (-2.81) (-4.78) (-2.83)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0193 0.3439 0.0191 0.3391 0.0870 1.1023 0.0871 1.0990
(1.00) (1.33) (1.00) (1.32) (1.08) (2.95) (1.08) (2.96)
*** ***
amihud tm1 -104.0971 -132.1461 -107.4929 -132.6251 -157.1114 -49.4871 -156.8734 -49.7849
(-0.84) (-1.22) (-0.90) (-1.24) (-1.40) (-0.63) (-1.40) (-0.63)
abs returns tm1 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(2.54) (1.62) (2.50) (1.45) (0.96) (-0.30) (0.96) (-0.21)
** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0040 0.0040 0.0017 0.0016
(1.51) (1.59) (0.45) (0.44)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2516 -0.2559 0.1605 0.1668
(-0.95) (-0.99) (0.58) (0.60)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0345 0.0289 0.0017 -0.0067
(3.31) (2.13) (0.32) (-1.53)
*** **
standardized volatility tm2 0.0402 0.0310 0.0079 -0.0044
(4.63) (3.26) (1.00) (-0.57)
*** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0306 0.0235 -0.0003 -0.0107
(3.85) (2.50) (-0.05) (-1.69)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4573 0.3496 0.4533 0.3473 1.4658 0.9110 1.4649 0.9175
(6.21) (4.82) (6.28) (4.85) (4.57) (2.50) (4.54) (2.52)
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** **
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 45047 34452 44912 34392 45047 34452 44910 34390
Adjusted R^2 0.0209 0.03 0.025 0.0319 0.1815 0.1959 0.1815 0.196
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0243 0.0321 0.0328 0.0352 0.1946 0.1958 0.1962 0.1958
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Table B.4 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership with “big” as an interaction variable and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes 
periods out of crisis and ranges between 2009-04-01 to 2009-09-30, and 2014-04-01 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
Table B.5 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly standardized 
volatility on ETF ownership and controls. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are 
lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges between 2009- to 2019-01-01 
Dependent Variable Standardized Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
big# ETF Ownership 0 -0.0282 -0.0374 -0.0282 -0.0370 -0.0014 0.0083 -0.0017 0.0082
(-1.81) (-3.74) (-1.85) (-3.75) (-0.07) (1.25) (-0.08) (1.24)
* *** * ***
big# ETF Ownership 1 -0.0448 -0.0396 -0.0439 -0.0389 -0.0112 -0.0121 -0.0118 -0.0126
(-4.36) (-4.29) (-4.37) (-4.29) (-0.63) (-0.91) (-0.66) (-0.93)
*** *** *** ***
log mkt cap tm1 -0.0614 -0.0529 -0.0606 -0.0523 -0.1825 -0.1262 -0.1824 -0.1269
(-8.20) (-7.00) (-8.30) (-7.01) (-4.81) (-2.81) (-4.79) (-2.83)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
inv price tm1 0.0193 0.3441 0.0191 0.3393 0.0870 1.1031 0.0871 1.0997
(1.00) (1.33) (1.00) (1.32) (1.08) (2.95) (1.08) (2.96)
*** ***
amihud tm1 -103.8358 -131.8501 -107.2350 -132.3686 -158.1258 -51.3260 -157.9194 -51.6519
(-0.85) (-1.22) (-0.90) (-1.23) (-1.41) (-0.66) (-1.41) (-0.66)
abs returns tm1 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(2.54) (1.62) (2.49) (1.45) (0.96) (-0.30) (0.96) (-0.21)
** **
bid ask spread tm1 0.0039 0.0040 0.0017 0.0017
(1.51) (1.59) (0.46) (0.44)
gross profitability tm1 -0.2519 -0.2561 0.1609 0.1672
(-0.95) (-0.99) (0.59) (0.60)
standardized volatility tm1 0.0345 0.0289 0.0017 -0.0068
(3.31) (2.13) (0.32) (-1.54)
*** **
standardized volatility tm2 0.0402 0.0310 0.0079 -0.0044
(4.64) (3.26) (1.00) (-0.57)
*** ***
standardized volatility tm3 0.0305 0.0235 -0.0003 -0.0107
(3.86) (2.50) (-0.05) (-1.69)
*** ** *
 cons 0.4586 0.3497 0.4545 0.3473 1.4659 0.9112 1.4651 0.9177
(6.22) (4.83) (6.29) (4.85) (4.57) (2.50) (4.54) (2.53)
*** *** *** *** *** ** *** **
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 45047 34452 44912 34392 45047 34452 44910 34390
Adjusted R^2 0.021 0.03 0.0251 0.0319 0.1815 0.196 0.1815 0.1961
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Table B.6 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly realized 
variance on ETF ownership and controls. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The variables are 
lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges between 2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
standardized etf share owned -.0040583 ** -.00289 * -.0039384 ** -.0028271 -.0038537 -.0004054 -.003948 -.0004263 
(-2.05) (-1.67) (-2.06) (-1.65) (-0.90) (-0.16) (-0.91) (-0.17)
log mkt cap tm1 -.0093252 *** -.0060394 -.0090656 *** -.0059447 -.0414641 -.0322363 -.0419284 -.0333432 
(-2.89) (-1.52) (-2.87) (-1.51) (-1.23) (-0.86) (-1.24) (-0.89)
inv price tm1 .0232041 .2371604 .0230058 .2364468 .1145377 1.007896 ** .1145117 1.005811 **
(0.89) (1.29) (0.89) (1.29) (1.17) (2.50) (1.17) (2.51)
amihud tm1 327.6978 39.22962 309.6154 39.48843 -89.25454 -36.25732 -90.47273 -35.9871 
(0.98) (-1.55) (0.98) (-1.56) (-0.31) (-1.18) (-0.31) (-1.16)
abs returns tm1 .0000207 * -.0000586 .0000162 -.0000627 .0000163 -.0000115 .0000149 -2.15e-06 
(1.98) (-0.67) (1.55) (-0.72) (1.02) (-0.35) (0.95) (-0.07)
bid ask spread tm1 .0015541 .0015674 .0021935 .002064 
(0.93) (0.94) (0.86) (0.84)
gross profitability tm1 .1278022 .1275947 .2581896 .2682295 
(1.40) (1.41) (1.45) (1.46)
standardized volatility tm1 .0226781 ** .0064703 ** .0056464 -.0116917 **
(2.06) (2.12) (0.63) (-2.00)
standardized volatility tm2 .010752 *** .0044439 * -.0059442 * -.012955 **
(3.09) (1.88) (-1.82) (-2.52)
standardized volatility tm3 .0074276 *** .0026456 -.0301341 *** -.0485082 ***
(2.66) (1.36) (-2.93) (-2.93)
 cons .0575114 ** .0084793 .0561148 * .0080864 .3126146 .1812246 .3169881 .1902952 
(1.99) (0.27) (1.98) (0.26) (1.10) (0.63) (1.11) (0.66)
Time-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0056 0.0063 0.0062 0.0063 0.0296 0.0228 0.0298 0.0233
Realized Variance 
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Table B.7 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly realized 
variance on ETF ownership with “big” and “crisis” as interaction variables, and controls. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample ranges 
between 2008-09-30 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Realized Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership  0 0 -.0017792 -.0021592 -.0017766 -.0021001 -.0018002 .000933 -.0018789 .000919 
(-0.38) (-0.73) (-0.39) (-0.72) (-0.27) (0.30) (-0.28) (0.29)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership  0 1 -.0070763 ** -.0059512 ** -.006781 ** -.0058522 ** -.0084333 -.0086181 -.0085679 -.0087937 
(-2.15) (-2.01) (-2.11) (-1.99) (-1.36) (-1.56) (-1.36) (-1.56)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership  1 0 -.002513 0.0044833 -.0024402 .0044758 -.0025794 .0087449 -.0026503 .0089781 
(-0.91) (0.56) (-0.92) (0.56) (-0.62) (1.02) (-0.63) (1.02)
crisis#big# ETF Ownership  1 1 -.0070782 ** -.0027815 -.0068829 ** -.0027406 -.0109459 ** -.0053577 -.011136 * -.0054728 
(-2.29) (-1.24) (-2.38) (-1.23) (-2.02) (-1.57) (-1.88) (-1.57)
log mkt cap tm1 -.0093782 *** -.0060334 -.0091158 *** -.0059383 -.0416122 -.0319896 -.0420765 -.0330928 
(-2.92) (-1.52) (-2.89) (-1.51) (-1.23) (-0.86) (-1.24) (-0.89)
inv price tm1 .0231938 .2375448 .0229962 .2368314 .1145458 1.008634 ** .1145199 1.006562 **
(0.89) (1.30) (0.89) (1.29) (1.17) (2.50) (1.17) (2.51)
amihud tm1 328.0636 -38.77818 309.9849 -39.03946 -89.66702 -37.24303 -90.88675 -36.99215 
(0.99) (-1.51) (0.98) (-1.52) (-0.31) (-1.21) (-0.31) (-1.19)
abs returns tm1 .0000194 * -.0000593 .000015 -.0000634 .0000165  -.0000113 .0000151 -1.84e-06 
(1.87) (-0.69) (1.43) (-0.73) (1.03) (-0.34) (0.96) (-0.06)
bid ask spread tm1 .0015456 .0015589 .0022005 .0020709 
(0.92) (0.93) (0.87) (0.85)
gross profitability tm1 .1272947 .1270944 .2616756 .2718075 
(1.40) (1.41) (1.46) (1.47)
standardized volatility tm1 .0226682 ** .006457 ** .0056403 -.011713 **
(2.06) (2.12) (0.58) (-2.00)
standardized volatility tm2 .01074 *** .004428 * -.0059467 * -.012972 **
(3.07) (1.88) (-1.77) (-2.52)
standardized volatility tm3 .0074179 ** .0026259 -.0301304 *** -.0485826 ***
(2.61) (1.36) (-2.93) (-2.92)
 cons .0578972 ** .0084341 .0564782 ** .0080376 .3137275 .1791288 .3180993 .1881682 
(2.01) (0.27) (2.00) (0.26) (1.10) (0.62) (1.12) (0.65)
Time-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0055 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0296 0.0228 0.0221 0.0233
 cons 0.4193 0.3396 0.4137 0.3367 1.5803 0.9760 1.5682 0.9770
(6.88) (4.93) (7.01) (4.98) (6.39) (3.06) (6.31) (3.06)
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Time-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
Firm-fixed effects False False False False True True True True
N 75523 45212 75319 45143 75523 45184 75317 45113
Adjusted R^2 0.0243 0.0321 0.0328 0.0352 0.1946 0.1958 0.1962 0.1958
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Table B.8 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly realized 
variance on ETF ownership with “big” as an interaction variable, and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes 
periods in crisis and ranges between 2008-09-30- to 2009-03-31, and 2009-10-01 to 2014-03-31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Realized Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
big# ETF Ownership  = 0 -.0006164 .0009393 -.0006157 .0009066 -.0002338 .0094212 -.0003451 .009773 
(-0.27) (0.13) (-0.29) (0.14) (-0.09) (0.79) (-0.13) (0.76)
big# ETF Ownership  = 1 -.0054699 ** -.0044173 ** -.005123 -.0040525 * -.0106187 -.0020463 -.0106762 -.0024245 
(-2.56) (-2.10) (-1.50) (-1.90) (-1.52) (-0.62) (-1.25) (-0.67)
log mkt cap tm1 -.0052769 *** -.003609 -.0051655 ** -.0032196 -.0798532 -.028016 -.0811703 -.0336936 
(-2.78) (-0.86) (-2.68) (-0.89) (-1.67) (-1.28) (-1.67) (-1.46)
inv price tm1 .1291968 *** 439507.00 .1221653 *** .0402367 .1336058 ** -.0218681 .1354889 ** -.0267771 
(2.94) (1.66) (2.77) (1.64) (2.51) (-0.22) (2.54) (-0.23)
amihud tm1 -109.4355 -84.43535 ** -164.3299 -77.91208 ** -419.3261 -10.42681 -447.9014 -8.737034 
(-0.11) (-2.13) (-0.17) (-2.02) (-0.47) (-0.79) (-0.50) (-0.73)
abs returns tm1 .0000531 *** .0000797 ** .0000509 ** .0000728 ** .0000487 7.84e-06 .0000473 6.23e-06 
(2.70) (2.38) (2.69) (2.54) (1.21) (0.19) (1.16) (0.14)
bid ask spread tm1 -.0001752 -.0001568 .0003271 .0002478 
(-0.99) (-0.91) (0.45) (0.43)
gross profitability tm1 -.0055566 -.0007056 .1044523 * .1066834 *
(-0.17) (-0.02) (1.81) (1.76)
standardized volatility tm1 .0642888 *** .0305909 .0294289 ** -.0352395 **
(5.71) (1.59) (2.35) (-2.31)
standardized volatility tm2 .0058774 .0299702 -.0282063 ** -.034281 *
(0.68) (1.56) (-2.58) (-1.82)
standardized volatility tm3 .004304 .0323636 -.1031716 *** -.1495473 *
(0.95) (1.49) (-3.62) (-1.85)
 cons .0182031 .0030078 .0190223 .0020827 .6214592 .1967824 .6336557 .2429678 
(1.12) (0.09) (1.16) (0.07) (1.62) (1.12) (1.63) (1.32)
Time-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 30476 10760 30407 10751 30422 10688 30352 10679.00
Adjusted R^2 0.0285 0.0006 0.0324 0.0030 0.0466 0.0222 0.0505 0.0254
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Table B.9 
The table shows estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of monthly realized 
variance on ETF ownership with “big” as an interaction variable, and controls. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. The variables are lagged tm1 (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3). The sample only includes 
periods out of crisis and ranges between 2009-04-01 to 2009-09-30, and 2014-04-01 to 2019-01-31. 
 
 
Summarized statistics 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable Realized Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
big# ETF Ownership  = 0 -.0019593 -.0015095 -.0019782 -.0014753 -.0087386 .0007543 -.0090257 .0008373 
(-0.41) (-0.48) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.67) (0.24) (-0.67) (0.26)
big# ETF Ownership  = 1 -.0078325 ** -.0052479 -.0076773 ** -.0051833 -.0074444 -.0122899 -.0075541 -.0125386 
(-2.29) (-1.58) (-2.26) (-1.56) (-1.22) (-1.57) (-1.20) (-1.57)
log mkt cap tm1 -.0104743 ** -.0063534 -.0103252 ** -.0062761 -.0360532 -.0391651 -.0369774 -.0395732 
(-2.11) (-1.33) (-2.10) (-1.32) (-0.93) (-0.86) (-0.95) (-0.88)
inv price tm1 .019307 .2596178 .019275 .2591406 .1204656 1.148267 ** .1200005 1.140391 **
(0.80) (1.23) (0.80) (1.23) (0.99) (2.61) (0.99) (2.62)
amihud tm1 -46.49668 -39.05127 -47.4727 -39.39244 -154.9364 -42.31706 -158.1072 -41.78963 
(-1.44) (-1.28) (-1.48) (-1.29) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.04) (-1.02)
abs returns tm1 9.95e-06 -.0001533 7.66e-06 -.0001583 -8.86e-06 -.0000584 -4.91e-06 -.0000396 
(1.05) (-1.08) (0.80) (-1.12) (-0.58) (-1.33) (-0.38) (-1.07)
bid ask spread tm1 .002746 .0027631 .0052518 .0050879 
(0.97) (0.98) (0.98) (0.97)
gross profitability tm1 .1597449 .1597869 .2706241 .286446 
(1.41) (1.42) (1.24) (1.26)
standardized volatility tm1 .0088901 ** .0053193 * -.0102256 ** -.016555 **
(2.10) (1.97) (-2.41) (-2.11)
standardized volatility tm2 .0073665 ** .0027198 -.0113874 ** -.0180752 **
(2.47) (1.51) (-2.19) (-2.60)
standardized volatility tm3 .0045205 ** .001325 -.0463104 *** -.0631108 ***
(2.65) (0.87) (-3.35) (-2.89)
 cons .0675826 .0080313 .0667384 .0076675 .2668616 .2273905 .2751111 .2307385 
(1.50) (0.21) (1.50) (0.20) (0.80) (0.64) (0.83) (0.66)
Time-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 45047 34452 44912 34392 45047 34452 44910 34390
Adjusted R^2 0.0046 0.0073 0.0047 0.0072 0.0278 0.0255 0.0281 0.0263
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List of ETFs in our sample 
100CHA 
AETF 
ATXEX 
BBVAI 
C40 
CAC 
CBATX 
CBDAX 
CF1 
CG1 
CH1 
CI1 
CO30 
CS1 
CSSLI 
CSSMI 
CSSMIM 
CSSSMIM 
CSW 
CU1 
DAXEX 
DDAXKEX 
ETFDAX 
ETFDAXK 
ETFMIB 
EWD 
EWG 
EWI 
EWK 
EWL 
EWN 
EWO 
EWP 
EWQ 
EWU 
GRE 
H25ETF 
IAEX 
IMIB 
ISF 
IUKD 
IUKP 
L100 
LYXDAX 
LYXIB 
MDAXEX 
MIDD 
OBXEDNB 
PSRU 
SLICHA 
SMICHA 
SMIEX 
SYGUK 
TDXPEX 
XACTOMX 
XACTSBX 
XASX 
XCAC 
XDAX 
XMCX 
XMIB 
XSLI 
XSMI 
XUKX 
 
